This paper evaluates the welfare effects of a monetary union (MU), compared to a oating exchange rate regime, using a quantitative business cycle model of a two-country world with sticky prices. It is assumed that, under a oat, there are shocks to the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. These shocks are shown to have a negative effect on welfare-the detrimental effect is stronger, the higher the degree of trade openness. A MU eliminates UIP shocks, and it may thus raise welfare. The welfare gain from MU is positively linked to openness. (JEL: E4, F3, F4)
Introduction
What are the welfare effects of a monetary union (MU)? This paper addresses that question using a quantitative (calibrated) microbased business cycle model.
It has long been recognized that a potential key bene t of a MU is the elimination of exchange rate risk, while a "cost" of MU is the loss of monetary policy autonomy. A widely held view is that the (net) bene t from a MU is positively linked to trade openness (McKinnon 1963) . Unfortunately, analyses of these issues have traditionally been based on standard Keynesian stickyprices models that lack a clear welfare metric.
Recent research has developed theories that are potentially better suited for normative questions: dynamic general equilibrium models of open economies with price stickiness-a literature often referred to as New Open Economy Macroeconomics, NOEM (see survey by Lane 2001) . However, thus far, normative NOEM studies have used highly stylized (often static) models (that permit to derive closed form solutions) which underpredict sharply the high volatility of exchange rates observed during the post-Bretton Woods era; 1 this may cast doubts on the relevance of those models for evaluating the welfare effects of a MU (compared to a oat). This paper assesses welfare using a richer, more realistic quantitative NOEM model of a two-country world. A key feature of the model is that-in contrast to earlier normative NOEM studies-it allows for stationary shocks to the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition (besides the standard productivity shocks); these UIP shocks can be interpreted as re ecting transitory biases in households' exchange rate forecasts. I use an empirical estimate of the timeseries process of UIP shocks in the post-Bretton Woods era to calibrate the model. UIP shocks enable the model to generate highly volatile nominal and real exchange rates, under a oat.
2 A MU is assumed to eliminate the UIP shocks (under a MU there is no scope for irrational exchange rate forecasts); a MU may therefore raise welfare.
Model variants with weak trade links between the two countries (1% imports/GDP ratio) and with strong trade links (20% trade share) are considered. These variants shed, inter alia, light on optimal monetary arrangements between the United States and Europe (weak trade links), and on optimal arrangements among European economies (strong trade). Monetary policy is described by Taylor-style interest rate rules. The parameters of these rules are set at the values that maximize world welfare (the sum of expected household utility in the two countries). A MU is compared to an optimized oat.
The model predicts that UIP shocks raise the volatility of consumption and of the real exchange rate, and that they reduce welfare; UIP shocks are more destabilizing for economic activity, and more harmful to welfare, in more open economies-the welfare gain from a MU (due to the elimination of UIP shocks) is thus higher, the greater the degree of openness. The predicted welfare gain from a MU between the United States and Europe is very slightly positive-the equivalent of a permanent 0.004% consumption increase (relative to the oat); within Europe, the predicted welfare gain from MU corresponds to a permanent 0.18% consumption increase.
The analysis here uses Sims' (2000) powerful new numerical technique for 1. See, e.g., Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) , Galṍ and Monacelli (2000) , Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) , Sutherland (2002) , Tille (2002) , Benigno and Benigno (2003) , and Devereux and Engel (2003) . 2. Other features that enhance the realism of the model are physical capital and incomplete international risk sharing. A rst step toward normative analysis of a quantitative NOEM model was made by Kollmann (2002) , who studied a small open economy. Several recent papers develop quantitative NOEM models, but do not compute welfare (see Kollmann (2001) for references).
With the exception of McCallum and Nelson (1999) , who also assume UIP shocks, these models typically underpredict post-Bretton Woods exchange rate volatility. After the research here was completed, I received a paper by Bergin and Tchakarov (2003) that uses quantitative NOEM models to conduct welfare analyses, based on the same numerical technique as the paper here (these authors do not assume UIP shocks, and they do not determine welfare maximizing monetary policy rules).
solving dynamic models. That method is based on a second-order Taylor approximation of the equilibrium conditions (around a steady state). 3 In contrast to the linear, certainty-equivalent approximations that are widely used in macroeconomics, this approach allows to capture the effect of risk on mean values of endogenous variables; that level effect turns out to be crucial for welfare. Compared to other nonlinear techniques, the method here allows to solve models with a large number of state variables-such as the present model.
The Model
There are two countries, "Home" and "Foreign. 
Final Good Production
The Home nal good is produced using the aggregate technology 
] is a price index for domestic [imported] intermediate goods sold in the Home market. Perfect competition implies that the Home nal good price is P t (its marginal cost). 
Intermediate Goods Producers
where e t is the nominal exchange rate (Home currency price of Foreign currency).
Intermediate goods rms set prices in buyer currency. They price discriminate between domestic and export markets, and maximize the value of their pro t stream, subject to a restriction on price adjustment (à la Calvo (1983)): these rms cannot change prices (in buyer currency) unless they receive a random "price-change" signal. The probability of receiving this signal in any particular period is 1 2 d, a constant. Firms are assumed to meet all demand at posted prices. (Kollmann 2003 derives the rms' price-setting equations.)
The Representative Household
The preferences of the Home household are described by
The Home household accumulates Home physical capital, subject to the law of motion
where I t is gross investment, 0 , d , 1 is the depreciation rate of capital, and f is an adjustment cost function:
The household holds nominal one-period Home and Foreign currency bonds. Its budget constraint is:
A t11 1 e t B t11 1 P t~Ct 1 I t 1 F t ! 5 A t~1 1 i t21 ! 1 e t B t~1 1 i t21
A t and B t are stocks of Home and Foreign currency bonds that mature in period t, while i t21 and i t2 1 * are the interest rates on these bonds. The Home household bears a real cost (in Home nal good units) of holding/issuing Foreign currency bonds, denoted F t :
This cost ensures that real bond holdings (and other real variables) are stationary, which allows to solve the model using the Sims (2000) method.
The household chooses a strategy {A t1 1 , B t1 1 , K t1 1 , C t , L t } t5 0 to maximize (1), subject to constraints (2), (3). The following equations are rst-order conditions of this problem:
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Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) Shocks
Taking a (log-)linear approximation of (4) and (5) (around B t1 1 5 0) yields:
Because of bond-holding costs (and second-order terms suppressed in this approximation), UIP (i.e., the condition i t 2 i t * 5 E t ln(e t1 1 /e t )) does not hold here. However, departures from UIP caused by bond-holding costs (and the second order terms) are small, in this model. Given the well-documented strong departures from UIP in the post-Bretton Woods era, between the major currency blocs (Lewis 1995) , I assume that the Home Euler condition for Foreign currency bonds (5) is disturbed by a stationary exogenous random variable, w t ("UIP shock"):
Up to a (log-)linear approximation (around B t1 1 5 0, w t 5 1), (4) and (6) imply
w t can be interpreted as re ecting a bias in the households' date t forecast of the date t 1 1 exchange rate, e t1 1 . 4 Home and Foreign households make identical exchange rate forecasts.
The counterpart to (7) for the Foreign household is: , in Foreign nal good units).
Market-Clearing Conditions
Markets for intermediates clear as intermediate goods rms meet all demand at posted prices. Market clearing in Home nal good, labor, and rental capital markets requires:
Monetary Policy Rules
Much recent research has focused on policy rules under which the nominal interest rate is set as a function of in ation and of real GDP (e.g., Taylor 1999). Here, I also include the exchange rate, e t , as an argument in the policy rule; this allows to study whether central banks should respond (directly) to that variable. These Home/Foreign policy rules are considered: denoted by variables without time subscripts, and x t 5 ( x t 2 x)/x is the relative deviation of a variable x t from its steady-state value. G p , G y , and G e are parameters.
Central banks make a commitment to set these parameters at time-invariant values that maximize world welfare, de ned as
I consider two exchange rate regimes: a " oat" (no constraint on exchange rate movements); and a MU (under which policy parameters are set at the values that maximize world welfare, subject to the constraint that the exchange rate has to be kept constant through time). 
Welfare Measures
A second-order expansion of the Home utility function (around steady state) gives:
is the variance of Ĉ t (for the parameters below, L 5 0.74). I express Home welfare as the permanent relative change in consumption (compared to steady state), z, that yields expected utility E(U(C t , L t )):
z can be decomposed into components, z m and z v , that re ect the means of consumption and hours worked, and the variance of consumption, respectively:
Solution Method and Parameters (Nonpolicy)
The model is solved using Sims' (2000) algorithm/computer code. I numerically maximize world welfare with respect to the monetary policy parameters (attention is restricted to parameter values for which a unique stationary equilibrium exists).
5. Fully optimal policy rules would allow for responses of interest rates to all current and lagged state variables; I focus on "simple" rules (such as 8) because: simple rules capture well actual central bank behavior; simple rules facilitate policy commitment; computationally, it does not seem feasible to determine fully optimal rules for the complex model here (see Kollmann 2003) . Adding selected right-hand side variables to (8) (own-and foreign-country GDP, employment, PPI in ation, CPI in ation, exports/imports in ation) only generates minor welfare gains, compared to (8). 6. MU is achieved by picking a "large" value for G e . When G e ¡`, the model is asymptotically equivalent to a structure in which the two rules (8) are replaced by these equations: (i) the sum of these rules i t 1 i t
(ii) e t 5 e t2 1 . The MU results below are based on that structure.
Parameters are symmetric across countries. The effects of the exchange rate regime depend on the steady state imports/GDP ratio, a m . In one variant of the model I set a m 5 0.01 ("low-trade" variant); in another variant, a m 5 0.2 (high-trade variant). These variants shed light on optimal monetary arrangements between the United States and Europe, and on optimal arrangements within Europe, respectively. I calibrate the low-trade variant to quarterly data for the United States and an aggregate of three large EU economies (France, Germany, Italy), EU3.
I set b 5 0.99; n/(n 2 1) 5 1.2; c 5 0.24; F 5 8; d 5 0.025; P d 5 P d* 5 1. The steady-state value of the UIP shock is set at w 5 1: in steady state, exchange rate expectations are unbiased (this entails that steady-state bond stocks are zero, A 5 B 5 A * 5 B * 5 0). Kollmann (2003) shows that Lane and Milesi-Ferretti's (2001) empirical regressions (that document a negative relation between cross-country interest rate differentials and net foreign asset positions normalized by exports) can be used to calibrate the bond-holding cost parameter at g 5 0.0038/Q m* , where Q m* are steady-state exports. The average price-change interval, 1/(1 2 d), is set at 4 quarters (d 5 0.75), consistent with microeconomic evidence on the frequency of price adjustment (Romer 2001, p. 315) .
In both the high-and low-trade variants, productivity follow this process:
where « t u and « t u* are white noises with standard deviation 0.0059 and crosscorrelation 0.18. Kollmann (2003) discusses estimates of quarterly US-EU3 UIP shocks , and argues that the behavior of these shocks can be captured by the following two-factor model:
where v t and h t are independent white noises with standard deviations 0.0220 and 0.0109, respectively. The low-trade (US-EU3) variant of the model with an exchange rate oat assumes (10); as discussed next, the UIP shock is assumed to "vanish" (w t 5 1), under MU. During the post-Bretton Woods era, EU countries have used a system of xed-but-adjustable exchange rates (EMS), followed by a currency union (EMU). This paper only considers irrevocable oats and MUs. I assume that, under an intra-EU oat, UIP shocks would obey (10)-that is, (10) is also assumed in the high-trade variant (with oat).
7. Equation (9) is a "symmetrized" version of a VAR model that I tted to quarterly U. S. and EU3 TFP (1973-1994) . Similar processes t well the behavior of TFP in a range of industrialized countries (e.g., Kollmann 1996) . 3.1.1. Float. In the low-trade world with sticky prices (and simultaneous productivity and UIP shocks), welfare and the optimized policy parameters under the oat are: z 5 20.006%; G p 5 7.9, G y 5 20.1, G e 5 0.0 (column 1). Optimized policy has an aggressive stance against domestic PPI in ation-notice the high value of G p (the standard deviation of P t d is close to zero: 0.01%). In closed economies with staggered price setting, optimal policy fully stabilizes PPI in ation, and implies that the behavior of real variables replicates the ex-prices equilibrium (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1997) . This helps to understand why, in the low-trade world (trade share: 1%), optimized policy has a strict anti-in ation stance, and most predictions (including welfare) are virtually identical across the sticky-and ex-prices versions (compare columns 1 and 5). (In the ex-prices economy, the monetary policy rule does not affect welfare-in that economy, I set the policy parameters at the values used in column 1.)
Results
With simultaneous productivity shocks and UIP shocks, nominal and real exchange rates are highly volatile (standard deviation of De t , RER t : 7.45%, 12.44%)-the model captures the high volatility of the US-EU3 exchange rate during the Bretton Woods era (standard deviation of linearly detrended log quarterly US-EU3 real exchange rate, 1973-1994: 12.89%).
Columns 2 and 3 (where the "low-trade" model is subjected just to productivity shocks, and just to UIP shocks, respectively) show that, under the oat, UIP shocks explain 99% of the variances of De t and RER t , but less than 1% of the variances of output and consumption (that are generated by simultaneous productivity and UIP shocks). Unsurprisingly, the wide exchange rate uctuations triggered by UIP shocks have a minor effect on aggregate activity when the trade share is low. UIP shocks have a negative effect on welfare, but that effect is very small (under the oat): z 5 20.009% when there are just UIP shocks (column 3).
Monetary Union.
If, under MU, there were UIP shocks comparable to those under the oat, then welfare would be noticeably lower: z 5 20.460% (not shown in Table 1 ); in response to UIP shocks, monetary policy would have to generate large movements of Home and Foreign interest rates to keep the exchange rate constant; this would make consumption, and in ation highly volatile (and be detrimental for welfare).
However, it seems plausible that a MU eliminates the UIP shocks (under MU there is no scope for irrational exchange rate forecasts)-and the subsequent discussion is based on that assumption. MU (without UIP shocks) generates higher welfare (z 5 20.002%; see column 4) than the optimized oat with UIP shocks (recall that there z 5 20.006%).
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According to the model here, a MU between the United States and Europe would raise welfare, but that gain would be very small (equivalent to a permanent 0.004 percent rise in consumption).
Like the oat, the MU exhibits a great deal of price stability (standard deviation of P t d : 0.08%). Under MU, the predicted standard deviation of the real exchange rate (0.67%) is markedly lower than under the oat (12.44%); by contrast, the standard deviation of GDP is roughly similar across exchange rate regimes (1.20% [1.39%] under MU [ oat] ), in the low-trade world. Because (in that world) exchange rate volatility has little effect on aggregate output and consumption, the suppression of that volatility hardly affects the volatility of these variables (and welfare). The predictions are consistent with the fact that exchange rate volatility between the major currency blocs was markedly lower during the Bretton Woods (BW) peg than in the post-BW era, while GDP volatility was roughly the same in both periods (e.g., Baxter and Stockman 1989; Kollmann 2002) .
Results for the High-Trade World
Columns 6 -10 show results for the high-trade world, a m 5 0.20 (Intra-Europe).
3.2.1. Float. In the high-trade world, under the oat, UIP shocks have a markedly more destabilizing effect on macro aggregates (the standard deviation of consumption induced by UIP shocks is roughly twenty times greater than in the low-trade world; see columns 3 and 8), and these shocks are markedly more harmful for welfare: z 5 20.188% with simultaneous productivity and UIP shocks (column 6), as well as when there are just UIP shocks (column 8) (compared to z 5 20.006%, in the low-trade world, with the simultaneous two types of shock). The low welfare (with UIP shocks) is mainly accounted for by the "meancomponent" of the welfare measure (z m 5 20.166%): mean hours worked (as well as the mean capital stock and mean GDP) exceed their steady state level by about 0.25% (mean consumption is much less affected). That level effect can be linked to the fact that UIP shocks induce sizable uctuations of productive inputs, especially of imported intermediate goods (standard deviation of imports, Q t m : approximately 7%); as nal good production functions are concave, 8 . Under MU, the optimized G p , G y parameters are very large (G p 5 5e5). Welfare is a very at function of G p , G y . Imposing moderate bounds on their absolute values (e.g., uG p u, uG y u # 50) does not affect the results. larger average quantities of intermediates are used to produce a given average quantity of the nal good, when there are UIP shocks (in the high-trade variant, mean aggregate inputs of domestic [imported] 
Monetary Union.
In the high-trade world, welfare under MU (without UIP shocks) is z 5 20.002% (see column 9)-which represents a noticeable welfare improvement, compared to the oat with UIP shocks. The welfare gain from the elimination of UIP shocks (due to MU) mainly re ects a reduction in mean hours worked (by 0.24%, compared to oat).
In the high-trade world, MU induces a sizable reduction in the variability of macro aggregates, and of the real exchange rate (standard deviation of consumption: 0.88%, compared to 2.08% under oat). Interestingly, the contribution of reduced consumption volatility to the welfare gain from MU is smaller than that of the fall in mean hours worked (the variance-component of the welfare measure is z v 5 20.004%, compared to z v 5 20.022% under oat). Note that the welfare gain from MU is greater in the high-trade world than in the low-trade world. The intuition for this is simple: Because UIP shocks are more destabilizing for real economic activity, and more harmful for welfare, the higher the degree of openness, the bene t from eliminating these shocks (by adopting the MU) is positively linked to openness. Empirically, the likelihood that a country pegs its exchange rate is positively linked to openness (e.g., Edwards 1996) . The model here can rationalize this fact.
